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I. Introduction 
 
Many developing countries face difficulties in generating sufficient revenues for 
public expenditure.  In some Arab countries, budget deficits and the unproductive use of 
public expenditures have limited the critical investments in both human resources and 
basic infrastructure that are necessary for providing a foundation for sustainable 
economic growth. In the last two decades, many Arab countries have embarked on 
economic and financial reform programs some of which are supported by the 
International Monetary Fund. These reform programs have usually included measures to 
raise tax revenues and to restructure tax systems. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of tax revenue shares 
and to construct an index of tax effort for the Arab countries. This study makes use of 
pooled time-series and cross-sectional country data for the 1994-2000 time period for 16 
Arab countries. The index of tax effort is constructed as the ratio of actual tax share to the 
predicted (or potential) tax share, as in previous work on this topic, Stotsky and 
WoldeMariam (1997), Tanzi (1981, 1987, 1992), Leuthold (1991) and Tait and 
Eichengreen (1978) among others.  
It should be emphasized here that the main purpose of pan Arab comparisons of 
tax effort is to reveal whether an Arab country is limited in its revenue collections by a 
low capacity to generate tax revenues or by an unwillingness to use the available tax 
capacity to fund public expenditures. Another reason is to give guidance as to the proper 
mix of fiscal policy to undertake in the event of a budget deficit. If an Arab country 
facing a budget deficit imbalance were already making the maximum use of its taxable 
capacity, this would suggest that regaining budget balance would require expenditure 
rationing rather than tax increases. 
The next section summarizes tax revenue performance in Arab countries. Section 
3 presents the model and reviews the literature on previous studies and discusses the 
different approaches that have been used to examine the determinants of tax effort. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical results while section 5 gives the conclusions and some 
policy implications. 
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II. Tax Revenue Performance in Arab Countries  
Tax Revenue performance varies across Arab countries. In the 16 Arab countries 
for which we managed to obtain complete and reliable data, the share of tax revenue in 
GDP was on average about 12.6 percent in 1994 (see Table 1). In these countries, in 
1994, the share of tax revenue in GDP was above 25 percent in only one country, 
Algeria, between 15 and 25 percent in 6 countries, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Tunisia and Syria, between 5 and 15 percent in 4 countries, Bahrain, Lebanon, Yemen 
and Oman and below 5 percent in the remaining countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sudan, 
Qatar and UAE.   
Tax revenue trends are not uniform across these Arab countries. Some countries 
have enjoyed sustained increases in tax revenue shares in recent years while others have 
seen tax revenue shares weaken. The most recent evidence suggests that tax revenue 
shares are, on average, beginning to strengthen. In the year 2000, the share of tax 
revenues in GDP was on the average about 14.9 percent, up by about 20 percent from its 
level in 1994. 
   
Table 1. Arab Countries: Tax Revenue (in percent of GDP) 
Country  1994  1995  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average 
Algeria  27.1 29 30.7 31.7 32.2 32.8 33.3  31.0 
Bahrain  7.4  7.7  7.8 6.5 8.8 8.7 8.9  8.0 
Egypt  22.6  21.1  17.5 16.5 17.6 18.6 19.4  19.1 
Jordan  20.7  20.5  21.4 18.9 19.6 20.2 22.6  20.5 
Kuwait  1.2  1.1  1.1 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.1  1.1 
Lebanon  10.8  11.6  14.1 12.6 13.5 14.3 15.1  13.1 
Sudan  4.8  6.5  5.9 5.8 6.5 6.8 6.8  6.2 
Mauritania  17.9  17.0  17.5 18.3 16.6 16.5 19.1  17.6 
Morocco  23.8  23.3  23.8 27.4 29.1 30.7 31.5  27.1 
Oman  7.1  7.4  7.5 8.8 6.8  7.50  10.1  7.9 
Qatar  0.975  0.98  0.98  0.98  1.0 1.1 1.1  1.0 
Saudi  Arabia  4.2  3.4  3.4 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.7  3.8 
Syria  17.5  18.6  15.6 16.3 16.7 17.0 18.0  17.1 
Tunisia  25  25 24.8 27.6 30.8 33.7 36.4  29.1 
UAE  1.2  1.3  1.5 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1  1.7 
Yemen  9.4 8.7 10.8 10.9 13.2  9.7  9.7  10.3 
Average  12.6  12.7  12.8 13.1 13.7 14.1 14.9   
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In general, tax shares in developing countries tend to be lower than in 
industrialized countries, Tanzi (1992). In fact, the tax shares in some Arab countries such 
as Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco were higher on the average than in Asia and African 
countries in recent years, Eltony (2000). In OECD countries, the share of tax revenue in 
GDP was on average about 38 percent (28 percent without social security taxes) in 1999, 
though there is considerable variation, with the share of tax revenue ranging from 29 
percent in Australia to 51 percent in Sweden, OECD (2000). 
On the other hand, Arab countries use a limited number of taxes. Taxes on goods 
and services comprised the largest share of taxes in 2000, accounting for about 5.1 
percent of GDP. International trade taxes accounted for 5.0 percent of GDP and taxes on 
personal income and profits accounted for about 4.6 percent, IMF (2001). 
Furthermore, there are several reasons for the relatively low share of tax revenue 
in GDP in Arab countries, though any generalization is difficult given the differences in 
the political and economic structures across these countries. Some of the Arab countries 
such as Lebanon, Sudan Algeria, and Yemen have experienced repeated and severe 
internal unrest, including civil wars, which has impaired revenue collections. In addition, 
the presence of large inefficient state-owned enterprises, few large private sector 
taxpayers, and hesitation to collect taxes from elites may also have limited revenue 
collections. 
Apart from general economic and political weaknesses, the tax structure in many 
Arab countries has impaired the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and 
incentives for growth, and has limited the ability to raise tax revenues, El-Erian & Tareq 
(1993) and Gillis (1989).  Furthermore, international trade taxes are typically 
characterized by an excessive number of nominal tariff rates, high rates, and numerous 
exemptions, resulting in significant dispersion in the rate of effective protection. Customs 
structures protect industries, leading to lower incentives to produce efficiently, and 
limiting economic growth. Export taxes and misaligned or multiple exchange rates also 
distorted domestic incentives for production. Corporate income taxes are often limited to 
the formal sector and are often characterized by high marginal tax rates and narrow tax 
bases. Multinational businesses often pay a disproportionate share of income taxes 
compared to local businesses, e.g. in Kuwait it is set at 50 percent of profits. Personal  
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income taxes are almost exclusively applied to wage income in the formal sector 
(typically government employment) and are often unwieldy, with high marginal tax rates 
and a small tax base, leading to tax evasion. 
In addition to poor tax structures, many Arab countries are characterized by weak 
tax and customs administrations, which impair efforts to raise tax revenues, Eltony 
(2000). Tax and customs administrations in these countries typically have excessive 
numbers of poorly trained and supervised staff, weak management practices, low salaries, 
and inadequate equipment and supplies.  Discretion in the application of the tax and 
customs law, owing to weak domestic legal and institutional structures, creates 
opportunities for corruption and tax and customs fraud. 
Nevertheless, in recent years, some Arab countries have made progress in 
improving their tax systems. An IMF study by WoldeMariam (1995) found that several 
Arab countries were able to increase their tax revenue shares in the context of the IMF 
reform programs. For instance, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, 
Mauritania and Yemen all have undertaken a comprehensive program of reform of both 
tax policy and tax administration, resulting in a significant improvement in the structure 
of their tax system and an increase in the tax share to GDP ratio in the year 2000.  
 
III. The Model  
In the previous studies, one approach measures taxable capacity by regressing for 
a sample of countries the tax revenue to GDP ratio on explanatory variables that serve as 
proxies for possible tax bases and other factors that might affect a country's ability to 
raise tax revenues. This regression approach has been applied to samples of developing 
and industrialized countries (see for example Tanzi (1981, 1987 & 1992); Leuthold 
(1991); Tait and Eichengreen (1978); Chelliah et al. (1975) and Bahl (1971)). The 
predicted tax ratio from such a regression is considered as a measure of taxable capacity 
while the regression coefficients can be interpreted as average effective rates on those 
bases. The ratio of the actual to the predicted tax ratios is then computed and used as an 
index of tax effort. For the most part, in this approach, tax effort is defined as a ratio of 
tax revenues to some measure of taxable capacity, e.g. GDP, thus assuming that the tax  
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bases and other explanatory variables reflect only differences in taxable capacity, Tanzi 
(1992).  
Moreover, in these previous studies, the main determinants of the tax share in 
GDP are presumed to include the sectoral composition of value added; the overall level 
of industrial development; and the importance of international trade in the economy. The 
sectoral composition of value added is likely to be an important influence on the tax share 
because some sectors of the economy are more suitable to taxation and generate taxable 
revenues. For some Arab countries, the share of agriculture in the economy may be an 
important determinant of taxable capacity because small farmers are known to be difficult 
to tax and the agriculture sector, in general, does not generate large tax revenues.  
On the other hand, the mining share may be important as a sector that can 
generate large taxable income. However, in Arab countries, oil extraction by state owned 
enterprises is common, thus limiting potential revenue collections from this source.  
Furthermore, the share of manufacturing may also be important as manufacturing 
enterprises are typically easier to tax than agriculture since business owners typically 
keep better books and follow better accounting practices and manufacturing can generate 
large taxable incomes if production is efficient.  
Moreover, per capita income is typically considered the best proxy for the overall 
level of development and economic structure sophistication. This factor may have 
explanatory power beyond sectoral shares, though these factors are usually linked to each 
other, since the share of services and industry increases with the level of development 
and per capita income. One problem with using nominal magnitudes in a cross-country 
analysis is that they must be converted into a common currency, such as the U. S. dollar. 
If exchange rates do not reflect purchasing power parities, then comparisons based on a 
common currency may be skewed, though if there is some systematic skewing across the 
countries then this may not bias the results. One possibility, however, is to convert the 
nominal magnitudes into a common currency using purchasing power corrected exchange 
rates. 
Furthermore, the share of international trade in the economy is a measure of 
openness. Certain features of international trade make it more suitable to taxation than 
domestic activities. In most Arab countries, the international trade sector is typically the  
  6 
most monetized sector of the economy and has gained increasing importance in recent 
years. Thus import and export shares could be an important determinant of tax share. 
A number of studies have attempted to assess the importance of these structural 
features. Chelliah et al. (1975) related the tax share in GDP to various combinations of 
explanatory variables, using a sample of 47 countries averaged over the 1969-71 period. 
They obtained the best fit using the agricultural share, the mining share, and the export 
ratio in GDP as explanatory variables. They found that mining is positively related to the 
tax share while agriculture is negatively related and the export ratio is insignificant.  
Updating the earlier work, Tait and Gratz (1979) used the same sample of 47 
developing countries with data averaged over the 1972-76 period. Their results suggest 
that the Chelliah et al. specifications are appropriate, using either non-export income per 
capita, the share of mining, and the share of non-oil exports in GDP as explanatory 
variables or non-export income per capita and the share of exports in GDP as explanatory 
variables. They did not find the share of agriculture to be significant. Their measure of 
the tax effort indices also produces similar results to the earlier study.  
Tanzi (1987) examined, for a sample of 86 developing countries, how the share of 
tax revenue in GDP is related to the logarithm of per capita income. He found a positive 
and significant relationship between these two. In a subsequent study, Tanzi (1992) 
extended his analysis to incorporate a sample of 83 developing countries over the period 
1978-88. He found that the relationship between tax share and per capita income is 
weakened. That is to say, the hypotheses that other factors, such as macroeconomic 
instability, the need to service debt and the changing structure of the economy, have 
become more important determinants. He estimated an alternative specification that 
related the tax share in GDP to the agriculture share in GDP, the share of imports in 
GDP, the foreign debt share in GDP, and per capita income. His results showed that the 
share of agriculture in GDP is strongly inversely related to the tax share and its 
explanatory power is greater than per capita income. He also finds that import share and 
debt share are important determinants of tax share. 
This study uses regression analysis to investigate the determinants of tax effort in 
Arab countries. It employs pooled time series and cross-sectional country data for 16 
Arab countries for the 1994-2000 time period. One benefit of using a wide scope of Arab  
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countries is that the sample is composed of countries that tend to have few economic 
characteristics in common, though among these Arab countries, there are many political, 
economic, and social similarities. The choice of sample is partly motivated by the need to 
obtain a data set where the variables can be measured in a relatively accurate, reliable and 
consistent manner. In addition, this study only uses ratios to GDP. GDP includes income 
earned locally that accumulates to non-residents and excludes income received from 
abroad by residents, since local income accruing to non-residents typically is taxed while 
remittances from abroad typically are not. Moreover, this study uses a cross-country, 
time-series data set, thereby taking advantage of explanatory variables that vary both by 
unit of observation (the country) and time. 
An error component model, which allows separate country intercepts, is estimated 
using pooled time-series and cross-country data. This model is also known as the fixed 
effect model. The reason for choosing the fixed effect model is that we are interested in 
making inferences conditional on the effects that are in the sample, Hsiao (1986), Greene 
(1993) and Baltagi (1996). That is to say, we are focusing on the set of Arab countries 
and our inference is restricted to the behaviour of these Arab countries. Furthermore, 
following the previous empirical studies, the specification of the tax effort function is as 
follows: 
 
Taxit  =   Ai     +  B1 YPit   + B2  Importit  +  B3  Exportit  +   B3  Miningit  
+   B4  Manuit   +   B5  Agriit   +  B6  Odebtit   +   uit             (1)      
  Where ( u)  is the error term , (i ) denotes the country and ( t)  denotes the time.  
The variables that presumed to determine the tax share in GDP, (Tax), are the 
share of agriculture, (Agri), the share of mining, (Mining), the share of manufacturing,  
(Manu), per capita income, (YP), converted into constant 1995 U. S. dollars, using both 
market exchange rates and purchasing power corrected exchange rates, the share of 
exports in GDP, (Export), the share of imports in GDP, (Import) and the share of 
outstanding foreign debts (Odebt).  
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IV. The Empirical Results 
The least squares estimation was used with all the variables are expressed in 
logarithm form and serial correlation correction when necessary. The empirical model of 
Equation (1) was estimated for two sub-samples of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries and non-oil Arab countries respectively and the sample of all Arab countries. 
However, in each case, the model was first estimated treating time and country effects as 
fixed then were tested for correlation of group-specific effects using Hausman Test 
(1978). The Hausman test rejected the random effect specification. In this paper, only the 
fixed effect estimates are reported. The discussion of the finding will begin with the GCC 
countries sample results.  
 
4-1. Results for the GCC Countries 
In this section, the result of regression equation for the six GCC is presented. 
These countries are mainly oil-based economies with very similar economic structure and 
primitive tax system. They also rely heavily on oil revenues, not taxes, to finance their 
expenditures.  The results are presented in equation (2) and Table 2.  
 
Tax  =   Ai*      +   0.444  YP  –   0.198  Mining              (2)   
            (1.67)            (-1.96)             
        
R-Square Adj.= 0.497   D.W. = 1.928    S.E.R.= 0.12    F= 240.5  
* (t-Statistics are reported in the parentheses).  
The results indicate that the mining share is negative and significantly related to 
the tax ratio while the per capita income is positive and also significant at the 10% level, 
in particular, the mining sector share is found to be the most statistically significant 
among all the variables. All the other variables were found to be statistically insignificant 
and in some cases possess the wrong signs and therefore have been dropped from the 
estimated equation. These results are consistent with intuition for this group of countries 
as their economies are heavily dependent on oil revenues for national income and on 
public spending for economic activities and thus they lack the economic and sectoral 
sophistication needed for an advanced tax system. Furthermore, all the country-specific  
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dummy variables are found to be statistically significant suggesting that factors specific 
to these countries (e.g., the political system; attitudes toward government; the quality of 
tax, customs, and other institutions of government; commodity price shocks, etc.) are 
important determinants of variations in the tax share in GDP (see the detailed results in 
the Appendix). 
For the most part, Table 2 indicates that the gap between actual tax and potential 
tax is wide and there is some room for increasing tax revenues via tax reform programs. 
The results suggest that almost all the GCC countries experienced an upward trend in 
their tax effort index, and all the GCC countries showed that the actual tax is lower than 
the potential tax, especially in UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. These results are 
not uniform across the GCC as Oman and Bahrain’s tax effort indices are relatively stable 
over the 1994-2000 period and close or slightly above unity especially in the year 2000. 
However, for the GCC countries that are facing a budget deficit there appears to be a 
need for tax reform to increase tax revenues.  
 
Table 2. GCC Countries: Tax Effort Index  
Country  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Bahrain  0.900 0.919 1.003 0.811 1.006 1.016 1.017 
Kuwait  0.889 0.883 0.917 0.921 0.929 0.928 0.919 
Oman  0.915 0.955 0.964 0.934 0.863 0.947 1.012 
Qatar  0.905 0.914 0.915 0.936 0.960 0.915 0.928 
Saudi  Arabia  0.820 0.888 0.897 0.972 0.942 0.970 0.977 
UAE  0.754 0.866 0.965 0.937 0.919 0.925 0.950 
         
 
4-2. Results for the Non-oil Arab Countries  
  This group of countries includes the most diversified Arab economies such as 
Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon and Syria but also includes the poorest Arab countries 
such as Mauritania, Sudan and Yemen. Moreover, it includes Arab countries with 
sophisticated and advanced tax systems. This group also includes the three Arab 
countries with the highest tax ratios; namely, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco and almost 
all of these countries are undertaking economic and financial reforms with the help of the 
IMF.   
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Tax  =   Ai     +  0.177  YP  +  0.072  Import   +  0.107 Export  
         (4.61)        (1.68)         (1.72) 
     + 0.062 Mining  –  0.087  Agri   + 0.090  Odebt        (3)   
       (1.87)     (-1.62)         (1.76) 
 
R-Square Adj. = 0.775  D.W. = 2.022    S.E.R.= 0.097   F= 103.0  
Equation (3) and Table 3 give the result of the regression for this group of 
countries. The results indicate that the  agricultural share is significant and inversely 
related to the tax ratio while the share of mining, the import share, the export share and 
per capita income are all positively related to the tax ratio and also statistically 
significant, in particular, per capita income is once more the most statistically significant 
among all the variables. These results are consistent with intuition, especially with regard 
to mining, which we have expected to have a positive relation with the tax ratio. 
Moreover, contrary to the previously estimated equation (2), the outstanding foreign debt 
was found to be statistically significant and possessed a positive sign, indicating that the 
share of outstanding foreign dept has a positive impact on the tax ratio in the non-oil 
Arab countries. This result is also intuitive and may point to the impact of IMF-aided 
economic and financial reform programs. Moreover, the share of the manufacturing 
sector in the GDP was found to be statistically insignificant and was dropped from the 
estimated equation.   
Furthermore, all the country-specific dummy variables are found to be statistically 
significant suggesting that factors specific to these countries are also important 
determinants of variations in the tax share in GDP for these countries (see the detailed 
results in the Appendix). 
Table 3 shows that for the majority of non-oil Arab countries, the actual tax is less 
than the potential tax, indicating that there is room to increase actual tax revenues in line 
with their taxable capacity, especially in some countries such as Yemen, Egypt, Syria, 
Mauritania and Jordan.  
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Table 3. Non-Oil Arab Countries: Tax Effort Index  
Country  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Algeria  1.043 0.925 1.012 1.009 1.003 1.065 1.090 
Egypt  1.047 1.041 1.023 0.917 0.858 0.867 0.935 
Jordan  1.027 1.073 1.057 1.081 0.936 0.945 0.948 
Lebanon  1.056 0.937 0.996 1.060 0.940 0.997 1.041 
Mauritania  1.034 1.003 0.970 1.004 1.019 0.934 0.952 
Morocco  0.966 0.879 0.859 0.874 1.014 1.062 1.103 
Sudan  1.070 0.940 1.098 1.068 0.967 1.020 1.012 
Syria  1.015 1.024 1.014 0.898 0.941 0.955 0.966 
Tunisia  0.894 0.878 0.858 0.843 0.948 0.997 1.094 
Yemen  1.041 1.007 0.904 1.022 0.996 1.034 0.908 
         
 
These results also suggest that non-oil Arab countries with a relatively high tax 
share tend to have a relatively high tax index (as for example Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco 
and Sudan), and their tax effort indices have experienced an upward trend. Although 
these results are not uniform across the Arab countries (as for example, Egypt, Jordan, 
Syria, Mauritania and Lebanon), the tax effort indices are relatively stable over the 1994-
2000 period but in some cases weakened towards the year 2000.  
 
4-3. Results for all the Arab Countries  
Equation (4) gives the result of the estimation using the sample of all 16 
countries, resulting in a panel data set of 112 observations.  
 
Tax =  Ai     + 0.214  YP  +  0.068  Import  –  0.089 Export  
         (2.68)        (1.66)         (-1.71) 
     –  0.044 Mining  – 0.007 Agri               (4)   
       (-1.82)    (-1.79)    
 
R-Square Adj. = 0.795  D.W. = 1.911    S.E.R.= 0.11    F= 527.4  
The results indicate that the agricultural share in GDP, the mining share and the 
export share are negative and significantly related to the tax ratio while the import share 
and per capita income are positive and also significant at the 10% level of significance. In  
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particular, per capita income is the most statistically significant among all the variables; it 
is significant at the 5% level. These results are consistent with intuition with the 
exception of the export share, which we might have expected to have a positive relation 
with the tax ratio. Surprisingly, the manufacturing share in the GDP and the share of 
outstanding foreign debts were found to be consistently insignificant and thus were 
dropped from the estimated equation. Furthermore, all the country-specific dummy 
variables are found to be statistically significant suggesting that factors specific to the 
countries are important determinants of variations in the tax share in GDP (see the 
detailed results in the Appendix). 
Table 4 shows that for the Arab countries that face a budget deficit there are needs 
for tax reforms and increased tax since they are not making the maximum use of their 
taxable capacity. With the exception of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco and to some extent 
Sudan, Lebanon and Bahrain, all other Arab countries could embark on tax reforms. The 
results also suggest that Arab countries with a relatively high tax share tend to have a 
relatively high tax index, though these results are not uniform across the Arab countries. 
The tax effort indices are generally unstable over the 1994-2000 period, though almost all 
the Arab countries have an upward trend. 
 
Table 4. Arab Countries: Tax Effort Index  
Country  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Algeria  0.920 1.007 0.997 1.006 1.049 1.070 1.140 
Bahrain  0.987 0.956 1.007 0.807 1.076 1.049 1.089 
Egypt  1.049 1.038 0.921 0.855 0.868 0.927 0.957 
Jordan  1.039 1.025 1.075 0.939 0.957 0.981 0.985 
Kuwait  0.915 0.942 0.940 0.909 0.921 0.911 0.900 
Lebanon  0.945 0.990 1.046 0.942 0.994 1.041 1.051 
Mauritania  0.990 0.948 0.990 1.014 0.941 0.957 0.971 
Morocco  0.872 0.860 0.849 1.005 1.055 1.029 1.196 
Oman  0.907 0.943 0.949 1.001 0.890 0.943 1.006 
Qatar  0.839 0.857 0.899 0.934 0.922 0.915 0.918 
Saudi  Arabia  0.883 0.889 0.892 0.971 0.960 0.971 0.971 
Sudan  0.944 1.014 1.026 0.973 0.997 1.011 1.025 
Syria  1.049 1.089 0.897 0.936 0.961 0.985 1.046 
Tunisia  0.901 0.882 0.853 0.963 1.026 1.118 1.134 
UAE  0.721 0.832 0.932 1.023 1.004 1.005 1.007 
Yemen  0.971 0.901 1.082 1.023 1.068 0.920 0.921 
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V. Conclusions 
The results of this study should be taken on the context of the main purpose of the 
study, namely, the comparison of tax effort across Arab countries in order to reveal 
whether an Arab country is limited in its revenue collections by a low capacity to 
generate revenues or by an unwillingness to use the available tax capacity to finance 
public expenditures. Therefore, we should be careful in interpreting these results and their 
policy implications, as the model does not take a full account of the country specific 
factors such as the political system; attitudes toward government; the quality of tax 
administration, customs, and other institutions of government; commodity price shocks, 
etc. The estimation results showed that these factors are highly significant in all the 
estimated equation and may this partially explain the Hausman test rejection of the 
random effect specification.   
Moreover, the results suggest that the main determinants of the tax share in the 
GDP for the Arab countries are the per capita income, the share of agriculture in GDP 
and the share of mining in GDP. These variables are statistically significant and 
possessed the expected signs. Other variables that are also important determinants are the 
share of exports and imports and in only the non-oil Arab countries, the outstanding 
foreign debt was found significant and positively related to the tax share.  
Finally, some Arab countries have substantially increased their tax effort in recent 
years while others have experienced marked declines. The measures of tax effort do, 
however, have implications for fiscal policies in the event of a budgetary imbalance. 
Arab countries with relatively low indices of tax effort, especially those of the GCC, are 
not limited in their tax revenue coefficients by a low capacity to generate revenues and 
may wish to place greater emphasis on increasing tax revenues rather than on rationing 
expenditures. With the exception of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco and to some extent 
Sudan and Lebanon, all other Arab countries could undertake tax reform program in 
order to increase their tax revenues.   
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Appendix 
 




LS // Dependent Variable is LTAXES      
Date: 04/09/02 Time: 11:51      
Sample (adjusted): 1 42      
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints      
Convergence achieved after 14 iterations      
     
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.  
     
BAH   -1.449206   1.032228   -1.713112   0.0809  
KUW   -3.402219   2.012281   -1.690728   0.1006  
OMAN  -1.130029   1.021970   -1.620224   0.0953  
QATR   -3.664353   2.084081   -1.758258   0.0883  
SUDI   -1.888781   1.034212   -1.829751   0.0708  
UAE   -3.224736   2.011577   -1.927170   0.0657  
LYP       0.444155    0.265883       1.670495    0.0946  
LMING   -0.198338   0.204801   -1.968441   0.0601  
 
     
R-squared     0.597264      Mean dependent var       0.985067  
Adjusted R-squared   0.496580      S.D. dependent var       0.866118  
S.E. of regression   0.123852      Akaike info criterion  -3.986143 
Sum squared resid   0.490861      Schwarz criterion   -3.609993 
Log likelihood     32.53945      F-statistic         240.5209  
Durbin-Watson stat   1.928224      Prob(F-statistic)    0.000000 
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LS // Dependent Variable is LTAXES      
Date: 04/09/02 Time: 12:03      
Sample (adjusted): 43 112       
Included observations: 69 after adjusting endpoints      
Convergence achieved after 23 iterations      
     
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.  
   
TUNS       2.495314     0.383784       6.501873     0.0000  
LEBN       1.376139     0.389955       3.528968     0.0009  
SYRI        1.864266     0.440711       4.230129     0.0001  
ALGR       2.228836     0.394301       5.652621     0.0000  
JORD       1.926578     0.445666       4.322915     0.0001  
EGPT       1.935766     0.377300       5.130572     0.0000  
MORC     2.441436    0.390514       6.251847     0.0000  
SUDN       1.050205     0.450518       2.331106     0.0237  
MAURT      2.078147     0.489148       4.248501     0.0001  
YEMN     1.547664    0.442055       3.501068     0.0010  
LYP       0.177866     0.038614       4.606239     0.0000  
LIMPRT       0.072621  0.043166   1.682356  0.0805 
LEXPRT     0.107924    0.062840       1.717436     0.0728  
LAGRI   - 0.086504    0.053156   -1.621037    0.0847  
LMING      0.062437     0.033469       1.865510     0.0678  
LODEPT      0.090151     0.051118       1.702231     0.0757  
 
     
R-squared     0.827053       Mean dependent var     2.853812  
Adjusted R-squared    0.774842       S.D. dependent var       0.488134  
S.E. of regression    0.097628       Akaike info criterion  -4.443293 
Sum squared resid    0.495623       Schwarz criterion   -3.892861 
Log likelihood     72.38685       F-statistic       102.9976 
Durbin-Watson stat    2.021883       Prob(F-statistic)    0.000000 
     








LS // Dependent Variable is LTAXES      
Date: 04/09/02 Time: 10:24      
Sample (adjusted): 1 112        
  18 
Included observations: 112 after adjusting endpoints      
Convergence achieved after 11 iterations      
     
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.  
     
BAH       0.635595     0.458320    1.519244    0.0940  
KUW   -1.529818    0.413157   -3.702753    0.0020  
OMAN      0.604994     0.387292       1.455957     0.0998  
QATR   -   1.722853     0.465120   -3.170913     0.0028  
SUDI   -   0.168589     0.079768   -1.800118    0.0730  
UAE   -1.109606    0.551399   -2.012629    0.0760  
TUNS       2.236735     1.304410       1.714748     0.0899  
LEBN        1.196625     0.363961    3.877316    0.0027  
SYRI      1.757499    1.218109       1.442809     0.1026  
ALGR       2.177308     1.206699       1.804351     0.0746  
JORD        1.950707     1.241114       1.571738     0.1096  
EGPT       1.753999     1.075536       1.630844     0.0893  
MORC        2.275072     1.222384       1.861176     0.0761  
SUDN       0.993750     0.50263   1.946191    0.0662  
MAURT       2.070260     1.132296       1.828374     0.0709  
YEMN        1.516203     1.010126       1.576857     0.0920  
LYP        0.213879     0.079844       2.678737     0.0487  
LIMPRT   0.067586    0.040681    1.6612001  0.0810 
LEXPRT    -0.089983    0.050252   -1.713572    0.0746  
LAGRI  -0.007447    0.004184   -1.79166 0.0729 
LMING  -   0.043516     0.023718   -   1.829601     0.0724  
 
     
R-squared     0.833915       Mean dependent var     2.157280  
Adjusted R-squared    0.794726       S.D. dependent var       1.117100  
S.E. of regression    0.110383       Akaike info criterion  -4.230750 
Sum squared resid    1.072219       Schwarz criterion   -3.690654 
Log likelihood     98.60804       F-statistic         527.4163  




Actual: TAXES    Forecast: TAXESF  
Sample: 2 112  
Include observations: 110  
   
Root Mean Squared Error    0.101252 
Mean Absolute Error       0.082693  
Mean Absolute Percentage Error 22.93774 
Theil Inequality Coefficient   0.024198 
      Bias Proportion    0.000855 
      Variance Proportion   0.002193 
      Covariance Proportion   0.859504 
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Equation (3)   
 
Actual: TAXES    Forecast: TAXESF  
Sample: 2 112  
Include observations: 110  
   
Root Mean Squared Error     0.138748  
Mean Absolute Error       0.096106  
Mean Absolute Percentage Error    32.14147  
Theil Inequality Coefficient   0.107466 
      Bias Proportion    0.001576 
      Variance Proportion   0.001325 
      Covariance Proportion   0.997099 





Actual: TAXES    Forecast: TAXESF  
Sample: 2 112  
Include observations: 110   
   
Root Mean Squared Error      0.103582  
Mean Absolute Error    0.080496 
Mean Absolute Percentage Error   21.54140  
Theil Inequality Coefficient   0.021345 
      Bias Proportion       0.000011  
      Variance Proportion    0.000397 
      Covariance Proportion   0.999592 
  





Many Arab countries face difficulties in generating sufficient revenues for public 
expenditure and may face a budget deficit. This study makes use of pooled time-series 
and cross-sectional country data for the 1994-2000 time period for 16 Arab countries to 
examine the determinants of the tax effort. 
The results suggest that in the Arab countries, the main determinants of the tax 
revenue share in GDP are the per capita income, the share of agriculture in GDP and the 
share of mining in GDP. Other variables that are also important are the share of exports, 
imports and the outstanding foreign debts. Furthermore, country-specific factors appear 
to be important determinants of tax share, e.g., the political system; attitudes toward 
government; the quality of tax administration and other institutions of the government. 
The results for the tax effort index showed that for Arab countries that are facing a budget 
deficit, especially those of the GCC, there is a room to increase their tax revenues  by 
reforming their tax systems. 